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Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself
William R. Corbett*
Abstract: Has too much tort law been incorporated into the case law under the
federal employment discrimination statutes? The debate on this issue has been
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S.
Ct. 1186 (2011). In Staub the Court referred to the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, a federal employment discrimination
statute, as a “federal tort.” The Court then adopted the tort doctrine of proximate
cause as the standard for evaluating subordinate bias (or “cat’s paw”) liability.
Staub was not the first case in which the Court has suggested that a federal
employment discrimination law is a federal statutory tort, but it was the most
express and direct statement. Moreover, the Court’s adoption of proximate cause,
one of the most complicated, confusing, and criticized concepts in tort law, to
analyze a prevalent issue in employment discrimination law is striking and
provocative. Staub reinvigorates the debate about whether the Court and courts
have imported too much tort law into employment discrimination law—the debate
about the “tortification” of employment discrimination law.
Most discussions of tortification of discrimination law trace the origin to
the Supreme Court’s discussion of torts causation standards in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). However, it actually began much earlier. The
ubiquitous pretext analysis, developed by the Court to analyze individual disparate
treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is a
thinly veiled version of the tort doctrine res ipsa loquitur. Although there have
been numerous critiques of the McDonnell Douglas analysis that have called for
its abrogation, none have exposed it as the much-maligned tort doctrine.
Evaluating McDonnell Douglas as res ipsa helps explain its weaknesses and
shortcomings. After almost forty years of the pretext analysis, it is time to expel it
from discrimination law. Abrogating the McDonnell Douglas analysis should be a
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significant first step in reconsidering the tortification of employment
discrimination law.
As one wit said: “If the thing speaks for itself, why doesn't it talk in
English?”1
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an
ordinary font of tort law. The anti-employment discrimination laws
are suffused with a public aura for reasons that are well known.
Throughout this Nation's history, persons have far too often been
judged not by their individual merit, but by the fortuity of their
race, the color of their skin, the sex or year of their birth, the
nation of their origin, or the religion of their conscientious
choosing. Congress has responded to these pernicious
misconceptions and ignoble hatreds with humanitarian laws
formulated to wipe out the iniquity of discrimination in
employment, not merely to recompense the individuals so harmed
but principally to deter future violations.
The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress
enacted consequently resonate with a forceful public policy
vilifying discrimination A plaintiff in an employmentdiscrimination case accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or
her personal interests in being made whole, but also as a “private
attorney general” to enforce the paramount public interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination.2
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INTRODUCTION
What if I told you that the most important analytical framework in employment
discrimination law is nothing more than a thinly veiled pretext for one of the most enigmatic,
vexing, and controversial doctrines of tort law? If I told you that the most basic and prevalent
analysis in antidiscrimination law really is one of the most distrusted and marginalized analyses
in tort law, would you be troubled? What if I told you that the ubiquitous McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis3 actually is just a slightly retrofitted version of res ipsa loquitur? Would you
think that the very foundational analysis of employment discrimination law had been based on
3

The three-stage analysis, proof structure, or proof framework for analyzing individual disparate treatment
(intentional) employment discrimination claims was announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The analysis also is commonly referred to as the pretext analysis. Since 1973, the
McDonnell Douglas analysis has become pervasive in employment discrimination law and beyond. A Westlaw
search indicates that from Jan. 1, 2011 to June 1, 2012, the case was cited in 3280 opinions in the federal courts and
202 opinions in state courts (search terms: “McDonnell Douglas” w/10 Green with date restriction). It is used for
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively held that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to the ADEA
and the ADA, it has recognized, without disapproval, that the courts of appeals apply it in those contexts. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311(1996) (reserving the issue in context of the
ADEA, but evaluating the case pursuant to the framework); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003)
(recognizing that the courts of appeals have used the analysis to evaluate summary judgment motions in disparate
treatment claims and applying it under the ADA). The McDonnell Douglas framework also is commonly adopted
by courts to analyze claims under state employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., Zaniboni v. Massachusetts Trial
Court, 961 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. 2012) (stating that the analysis applies to claims under Massachusetts
employment discrimination law). Beyond employment discrimination law, the pretext analysis has been adopted to
analyze other types of federal and state employment claims. See, e.g., Sabourin v. University of Utah, 676 F.3d 950
(10th Cir. 2012) (applying analysis to retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Eagen v.
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478, 487 & n.5 (Conn. App. 2012) (recognizing adoption
of pretext analysis for various types of state employment law claims).
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the best tort law had to offer or its dregs? Would this revelation help explain why current
employment discrimination analysis is so badly confused and discredited?4 If I told you those
things, would you consider that perhaps employment discrimination law should be detortified, at
least to some extent, by returning res ipsa loquitur to tort law, and thus permitting employment
discrimination to speak for itself without the artificial contortions of an ill-fitting analysis?
Would you think that employment discrimination law should abandon its most fundamental
analysis--the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis? That monumental step would immeasurably
improve employment discrimination law. It also might provide an impetus to consider the larger
issue of whether transplanted tort law has become too predominant in employment
discrimination law and has eroded to some extent the original public policy and civil rights
foundations of that body of law.
Almost half a century ago, Congress began enacting federal statutes intended to
implement an important public policy regarding basic civil rights--nondiscrimination in
employment. Given the history of discrimination in this nation, it would be difficult to imagine a
more important public policy.5 Congress largely left to the courts the mission of fleshing out the

4

Attorney Carter G. Phillips, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, expressed the complexity of the
employment discrimination proof structures this way: “I will say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have
not seen one area of the law that seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular one is.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No. 08-441), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-441.pdf (statement by Carter G. Phillips,
arguing for respondent); see also Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 307-08 (2004) (stating that “the statutes do not define `discrimination,’” that “Title VII law
has never been easy,” and that “[a]fter more than a decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII
law has never been more complex and confusing”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) [hereinafter Sperino, Rethinking] (positing that the rigid proof structures that control
employment discrimination law have “led to doctrinal, procedural, and theoretical confusion within employment
discrimination law and . . . mired the field in endless questions about frameworks rather than in addressing the
field’s core issues”).
5
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1962) in UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2156
(1968) (“Clear enunciation and implementation of a national policy on equal employment opportunity are obviously
long overdue at this point in the history of the United States.”); Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired
Evidence Defense to Employment of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 189
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lean statutory language with doctrine and principles regarding proof of violations.6 With such a
mission courts could create legal principles and doctrine out of whole cloth or they could turn to
existing bodies of law to borrow principles and doctrines,7 making adjustments to adapt the
transplanted law to its new objectives. As seemed likely, the courts both borrowed and created.8
For borrowing and adapting, to what substantive body of law would the courts turn in developing
the law of employment discrimination? There were several possibilities, including contract,
constitutional, agency, property, and tort. The courts through the years have imported doctrine

(1993) (“Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an attempt to assuage a national crisis . . . . Recognizing
that discrimination injured the country as a whole, Congress passed Title VII to achieve broad social goals.”). There
may be no more eloquent statement of the objectives of Title VII than that proclaimed by the Third Circuit in
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated by 514 U.S. 1034 (1995), supra
text accompanying note __ (2).
6
For an interesting discussion of Congress’s delegation to the courts and the EEOC of the interpretive role for Title
VII, see Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010). Professor Lemos discusses the political battle over
whether the principal interpretive role would be delegated to the courts or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). She notes that ultimately Congress weakened the enforcement authority of the new EEOC
and therefore delegated a larger interpretive role to the courts. Id. at 385-86. Professor Suzanna Sherry posits that
when Congress does not supply factual underpinnings for legislation in either the statues or the legislative history,
the Supreme Court supplies the foundational assumptions that inform the implementing doctrines. See Suzanna
Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 161[hereinafter, Sherry, Foundational
Facts].
7
However, resort to common law sources is not necessarily an apt choice. See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination
Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, __ U. ILL. L. REV. __ (34)(2012) [hereinafter Sperino,
Discrimination Statutes] (“[I]t is unclear why judges would look to the common law to define terms in a statutory
regime that is not generally drawn from the common law and that does not mimic the common law.”); cf. Robert
Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1242 (1988) (“Since the national
policy against discrimination in employment is not based on the common law, a strong argument can be made that
causal analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law as it is in the law of
negligence.”). The propriety and balance of importing common law doctrines to develop law under the employment
discrimination statutes is a topic that merits separate treatment. For now, it is important to note that courts should
recognize some tension, and in some cases, incongruence of purpose between some common law principles and
employment discrimination law. Indeed, some common law principles will be antithetical to employment
discrimination law. For example, Professor Richard Epstein recognizes that the employment discrimination laws are
diametrically opposed to the common-law based principle of employment at will. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992). Commentators have
made the case against a common law “baseline” for employment discrimination law. See, e.g., Theodore Y.
Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1, 70 (1990) (discussing the “inherent[] inconsist[ency]” of survival of “common-law economic and
political premises in light of a statutory scheme” that significantly impinges on employment at will).
8
Regarding the courts’ creation of new law, consider for example, the development of the disparate impact theory of
employment discrimination. See infra Part II.C.1.
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and principles from various bodies of law,9 but tort law is the repository to which the courts have
turned most often.10
Although many of the concepts, constructs, principles, and doctrines of tort law have
proven useful in the context of the public policy statutes, it is important to keep in mind the
different objectives and balance of goals of tort law and public policy statutes such as the
employment discrimination laws.11 Some torts concepts and principles might work well if
modified, while still others might not be sufficiently adaptable. Thus, courts should have been
careful about both adopting too much tort law that is not adaptable and adopting tort law without
making needed modifications.12 Almost fifty years after the enactment of the first
antidiscrimination law, we find that we have a body of case law that has imported a large volume
of torts principles and doctrine, including cause in fact, proximate cause, and res ipsa loquitur.
9

See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 163, 171 (2007) (noting “the `background’ rules of contract, tort, and property [that] have emerged to
play a vital role in the application of the statutes and doctrines that govern employment discrimination . . . cases”).
For example, the Supreme Court has used agency law principles in determining when employers should be liable for
sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Burlington Northern Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). In developing a proof structure for cases involving direct evidence of discrimination,
the Court turned to the mixed-motives framework developed in the context of a public employee’s asserting a
violation of first amendment rights. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (adopting the framework
developed in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). As will be discussed below,
however, one of the most divisive issues in the splintered Price Waterhouse decision was the standard of causation,
and that issue prompted debate about various tort standards of causation that could be incorporated in the Mt.
Healthy analysis. See infra Part I.D.
10
See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 437, 519-20 (2002) (stating that “the courts have frequently looked to common-law tort doctrines to create the
common law of Title VII”).
11
See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Adapting agency law principles to
employer liability for sexual harassment, the Court noted that “such common-law principles may not be transferable
in all their particulars to Title VII.” Id. at 72. See also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the
Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for the Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 66, 93 (1995) (contending that “[s]exual harassment is not merely a common-law tort, such as
assault, battery, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress; it is also a statutory wrong for which
Congress has provided free government investigations, federal jurisdiction, and attorneys' fees as well as legal
damages”).
12

Professor Sperino distinguishes between importation of “pure common law” and common law doctrine that is
adjusted to the particular employment discrimination law. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note___, at
___ (45 & 51).
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More important than the volume is the centrality of imported tort law in the corpus of
employment discrimination law. For example, much of the core of individual disparate
treatment law, the most important theory of employment discrimination law,13 is founded on
torts standards of causation and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently baldly declared in Staub v. Proctor Hospital14 that an employment discrimination statute
is a federal tort. The Staub Court then proceeded to adopt one of the most complicated and
criticized principles of tort law as the standard to resolve the commonly occurring employment
discrimination issue presented in the case.
Over the years some scholars have questioned whether the “tortification” of employment
discrimination law is an appropriate evolution for a body of civil rights and public policy law.15
At this point in the development of employment discrimination law, it is appropriate to ask if this
body of law has become too dominated by imported tort law and, more importantly, imported
tort law that has been insufficiently adapted to achieve the public policy purposes of statutes.
While the Court’s recent proclamation in Staub about an employment discrimination statute
being a federal statutory tort and its consequent incorporation of more tort doctrine has captured
the attention and concern of employment discrimination scholars,16 it is just the latest occurrence
in the ongoing and escalating tortification. It follows just two years after the Court in Gross v.
FBL Financial Services,17 to the surprise of many, rejected application of the mixed-motives
proof framework under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and concomitantly

13

See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (declaring that “[u]ndoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII”)
14
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
15
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B. U. L. REV. ___ (2012)[hereinafter
Sullivan, Tortifying]; Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note ___; Zemelman, supra note ___.
16
See Sperino, supra note ___; Sullivan, supra note ___.
17
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
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entrenched but-for causation, the most basic, rigorous and plaintiff-hostile torts cause-in-fact
standard, as the interpretation of the statutory language “because of . . . age.”18
Amidst concerns about the tortification of employment discrimination law, one of
employment discrimination law’s oldest and most firmly established doctrines has never been
impugned for its “tortiness.” While the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework has been the
subject of extensive criticism,19 its tort lineage has flown beneath the radar of scholarly criticism.
The McDonnell Douglas or pretext proof structure is a thinly veiled version of res ipsa loquitur,20
and it is a tort doctrine that perhaps never should have been imported into employment
discrimination law. Regardless of the propriety of the importation of res ipsa loquitur into
employment discrimination law in 1973, the McDonnell Douglas framework has not been
adequately modified from its res ipsa origins to serve the differently balanced objectives of the
public policy statutes. Moreover, res ipsa McDonnell Douglas, which is based on the
persuasiveness of assumptions supporting an inference, has not been substantially or adequately
revised over its forty-year life to reflect changes in the occurrence of discrimination in the
18

Id. at 180. Gross is discussed infra Part I.D.
Criticism of McDonnell Douglas is almost as ubiquitous and unabating over the years as use of the framework
itself is in the case law. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence and
Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43 (1993); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2259 (1995); Judith Olans
Brown, Stephen N. Subrin & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1527 n.182
(1997); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment
Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996); Kenneth R. Davis The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem:
Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997).
20
See, e.g., Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing the McDonnell Douglas
analysis as “a cousin of res ipsa loquitur”); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 982 n.258 (1995) (stating that “[t]he pretextual channel resembles the res
ipsa loquitur model in the law of torts”); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks
Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 85 (1998) (observing that “the Hicks majority's explanation of the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine procedural framework strongly echoes the res ipsa loquitur procedural framework”);
Sherry, Foundational Facts, supra note __, at 164 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas essentially applies the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to employment discrimination: merely failing to hire (or firing) speaks for itself as evidence of
discriminatory intent”); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549,
1564 (2005).
19
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workplace, and perhaps more importantly, changes in societal views about the occurrence of
employment discrimination. Thus, the res ipsa loquitur of employment discrimination law has
become not just unhelpful, but an impediment to proving discrimination in many disparate
treatment claims and an obstacle to improving and updating the analytical tools of employment
discrimination law.
With the tortification of employment discrimination law having reached a new level of
audacity in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, it is an opportune time to consider both a narrow and a
broad proposition linking McDonnell Douglas and Staub. Many of the criticisms that have been
addressed to the Court’s incorporation of proximate cause into employment discrimination law
apply with at least equal force to the Court’s decision in 1973 installing res ipsa loquitur as the
basic analytical framework for intentional discrimination. Second and more broadly, many of
the problems and criticisms associated with Staub and the McDonnell Douglas analysis are
symptomatic of the more overarching issue--the indiscriminate tortification of employment
discrimination law. Almost forty years after it was announced, the res ipsa loquitur of
employment discrimination law is preventing employment discrimination from speaking for
itself, and the newly adopted proximate cause standard of Staub has unleashed new uncertainties
and concerns in discrimination law. Unmasking McDonnell Douglas as almost unexpurgated
tort law that has been foisted upon employment discrimination law should help unseat the
reigning foundational analysis. Notwithstanding its pervasiveness and popularity with the
courts, the res ipsa loquitur of employment discrimination law has not yet achieved statutory
enshrinement,21 although future codification is by no means farfetched.22 If the tort origins and

21

See, e.g., Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, supra note __, at 104 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas is not
codified in any statutory language”).

9

foundations of the pretext analysis could be used to undermine it while it is common-law based,
such a monumental development might advance a dialogue about the larger topic of importing
tort law into employment discrimination law.23 While employment discrimination law still
retains some of its civil rights and public policy aura, it is time to reclaim some of that ground by
acknowledging that tort principles and constructs should not so readily be imported into
employment discrimination law.
Part I of this Article discusses the changing perception of the employment discrimination
laws—how and why the laws have come to be viewed as federal torts. Part I also considers
some of the incorporations of tort law into employment discrimination law that have constituted
the “tortification” of the law. Part II critically examines the McDonnell Douglas or pretext
analysis as an adoption of res ipsa loquitur and contrasts that adoption of tort law with more
innovative employment discrimination principles, standards, and proof frameworks created by
the Supreme Court and Congress. Part III proposes the abrogation of the McDonnell Douglas res
ipsa analysis’s dominance of employment discrimination law. This part demonstrates how
poorly res ipsa loquitur accommodates analysis of employment discrimination claims. Casting
off the vexing McDonnell Douglas analysis, which is itself a mere pretext for res ipsa loquitur,
would be a good first step in reversing the almost haphazard tortification of employment

22

Consider, for example, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, the legislation introduced in
2009 and again in 2012 to overturn Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). See S. 1756, 111th Cong.,
1st Sess. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); S. 2189, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (2012). The bills would
have codified the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework by providing that plaintiffs asserting employment
discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “may demonstrate an
unlawful practice through any available method of proof, including the analytical framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Id. at § 2(b)(3)(C).
23
Commentators referring to the tortification of employment discrimination law almost invariably are using the term
in a pejorative sense. Compare RED HOT CHILI PEPPER, CALIFORNICATION (Warner Bros. Record 1999). The
adoption and adaptation of tort law in employment discrimination law has not always been bad, and future
incorporations need not be bad.

10

discrimination law. It would be one giant leap toward letting employment discrimination speak
for itself.

I. The Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law
A. Staub--Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law Reaches its Zenith
When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, it is doubtful that Congress
or the Supreme Court would have characterized the federal employment discrimination law as a
statutory tort. It was, instead, primarily a public policy and civil rights statute aimed at
eradicating, in the employment setting, the most socially caustic and destructive forms of
discrimination that had blighted the nation throughout its history.24 Since early in the
employment discrimination law era, however, the courts, and to a lesser extent Congress, have
vigorously infused discrimination law with the principles of tort law.25 During its 2010-11 term,
the Supreme Court moved farther down the road of reconceptualizing the federal employment
discrimination laws as federal torts rather than broad public policy statements regarding civil
rights. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital,26 the Court, adopting a standard for subordinate bias or
“cat’s paw” liability,27 stated that “when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background
of general tort law.”28 Although the Court was analyzing the Uniformed Services Employment

24

See supra note ___ (5); see also H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating Title VII’s purpose to eliminate discrimination); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that “the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace”).
25
It is interesting to note that this importation of law is not a one-way street. Professor Martha Chamallas writes of
the “degree to which the concepts and values of civil rights law have migrated or can be expected to migrate into tort
law.” Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Immigration From Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2115, 2118 (2007) [hereinafter, Chamallas, Discrimination].
26
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
27
The Court explained the issue as follows: “[plaintiff] sought to hold his employer liable for the animus of a
supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision.” Id. at 1190. The Court also
explained the origin of the term “cat’s paw.” Id. n.1.
28
Id. at 1191.
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and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),29 the Court clearly was suggesting that Title VII and
the other employment discrimination laws are federal torts as well.30
The bare statement in Staub was jarring enough, but it was not the first time that the
Court has made such a statement about employment discrimination laws.31 Indeed, Justice
O’Connor, in sorting through torts standards of causation to choose one for the mixed-motives
analysis in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, referred to Title VII as
creating a “statutory employment `tort.’” 32 Beyond the Court’s labeling in Staub of an
employment discrimination statute as a federal tort, what was more telling was the Court’s
adoption of the tort concept of proximate cause, one of the most maligned principles of tort law,
as the test for deciding when to attribute the discriminatory motive of a subordinate to a
superior.33

29

Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334.
The principle that the Court was discussing in Staub, subordinate bias liability or cat’s paw liability, is a general
discrimination issue that arises under all of the employment discrimination laws. The USERRA case simply served
as a vehicle to resolve the issue for all of employment discrimination law. The Court had granted certiorari to
resolve the issue several years earlier in a Title VII case that settled before the Court’s decision. See EEOC v. BCI
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). Moreover, among the
three cases the Court cited in support of the federal tort proposition was a Title VII case--Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). The Court had not actually called Title VII a federal tort in Ellerth; the Court
said, “Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine.” Id.
31
See Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note __, at ___ (2) (“Although Title VII has often been described as creating a
statutory tort, the panoply of tort doctrines has been applied to this statutory scheme only sporadically, and then
often in forms influenced by specific statutory language of the law.”).
32
490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Professor Bernstein chronicles, Justice O’Connor was
the primary proponent of the thesis that employment discrimination law is statutory tort law. Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 510 (1997) (stating that “her colleagues on the
Court have never effectively refuted Justice O'Connor's cogent position that employment discrimination is a tort in
all but name”).
33
Many have decried the complexity, uncertainty, and other negative qualities of proximate cause. Indeed, the
dissatisfaction with proximate cause has been so great that the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces “proximate
cause” with “scope of liability,” explaining that proximate cause is a poor term to describe the idea embodied in the
term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM Ch. 6. Scope Of
Liability (Proximate Cause) Special Note on Proximate Cause (2010). Dean Mark Grady, in the course of offering a
defense of proximate cause for its greater-than-appreciated predictability and cohesiveness, recognized that many
believe that proximate cause is basically incoherent, that its cases cannot be predicted, and even that they illustrate
some fundamental disorder of the common law. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV.
293, 294 (2002); see also Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note __, at ___ (22) (stating that “[c]omplaints about the
nebulousness of the concept are numerous and longstanding, and there have been determined efforts to eradicate it
30
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Why the Court incorporated proximate cause into the subordinate bias liability analysis is
perplexing. Regarding the result in the case, as Professor Charles Sullivan has noted, the
invocation of proximate cause seems gratuitous in Staub.34 More broadly, proximate cause
seems an unusual concept to invoke in employment discrimination law—ill-suited to the job.35
Where the adoption of proximate cause will lead in employment discrimination law is difficult to
foresee.36
Although the Court’s treatment of employment discrimination law in Staub has been
provocative,37 it was just the latest step in the ongoing transformation of the employment
discrimination statutes into federal statutory torts. However, Staub represents a significant step
because the Court both unequivocally declared an employment discrimination statute to be a tort
and adopted one of the most vexatious of all tort doctrines to address a common employment
discrimination issue.

B. In the Beginning
The tortification of employment discrimination law was not imminent when the Supreme
Court began interpreting Title VII and developing the law. In its first significant encounter with

from legal discourse”); Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note ___, at ___(4) (quoting a leading torts treatise
regarding the disagreement and confusion about proximate cause).
34
Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note ___, at ___ (20-21).
35
Sullivan notes three reasons: 1) Proximate cause is “a notoriously amorphous concept even in those areas in
which it applies”; 2) proximate cause in torts applies to negligence not intentional torts, and disparate treatment
denotes intentional discrimination; and 3) tort law has used proximate cause primarily for physical injuries, not
economic injuries. See id. at ____(21). Even a commentator who is generally favorable about Staub, recognizes
the uncertainty the Court left in its wake. See Benjamin Pepper, Note & Comment, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: A
Tenuous Step in the Right Direction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363 (2012).
36
Professor Sullivan posits that the Court may have been preparing to hold that unconscious discrimination is not
actionable because such discrimination does not cause the harm. Sullivan, supra note ___, at ___ (21). Professor
Sperino predicts that “importing proximate cause into employment discrimination law will further limit the reach of
federal discrimination law, in line with already conservative interpretations of factual causation.” Sperino,
Discrimination Statutes, supra note ___, at ___(3).
37
See, e.g., Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note __, at ___; Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note __, at ___.
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Title VII,38 the Supreme Court in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.39 adopted disparate impact,
an innovative theory of discrimination advocated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.40 Under the theory, facially nondiscriminatory employment practices and criteria
that have a statistically significant disparate impact on members of a protected class constitute
illegal discrimination, regardless of intent, if they cannot be justified by their relationship and
necessity to the job in question.41 Although it has been argued that the EEOC created the
disparate impact theory,42 Professor Carle, in an insightful article, has traced the origins of the
theory to activists within the National Urban League who developed “experimentalist regulatory
strategies” in the early 1900s.43 No one disputes, however, that the agency charged with
enforcement of Title VII played a major role in the development of and advocacy for disparate
impact,44 a legal theory that was not borrowed from tort law or any other obvious common law
source. In adopting the disparate impact theory, the Court spoke in eloquent language about the
purpose of Title VII to “proscribe[] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation.”45 Further, the Court proclaimed: “What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the

38

The Court decided one Title VII case before Griggs: Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). The
per curiam opinion reversed a summary judgment on the issue of whether women not having preschool age children
was a bona fide occupational qualification for a job.
39
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40
See generally Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV.
251 (2011).
41
See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The definition and framework for disparate
impact were codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k).
42
See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY,
1960-1972, at 249-50 (1990); Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of
the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J.
429, 491-500 (1985).
43
See Carle, supra note ___, at 270-74.
44
See, e.g., Lemos, supra note ___, at 398-99 (discussing the Court’s reliance on the EEOC’s guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures).
45
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.”46
Disparate impact was innovative and expansive law, and it has been controversial, with
some arguing that the Court reached beyond Congressional intent in enacting Title VII.47
However, arguments regarding disparate impact’s questionable lineage and its alleged
inconsistency with Congressional intent were rendered moot by Congress’s codification of a
version of disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.48 Although the battle about
disparate impact’s past is merely academic, the threat to its future viability is real, with both
commentators and a Supreme Court Justice positing that the disparate impact theory may violate
the Equal Protection Clause.49
After Griggs was decided in 1971, one might have forecast that the Court would develop
the law of Title VII by being creative and fashioning a body of employment discrimination
principles and doctrines that was not simply or largely imported from the common law.50
However, the impulse was short-lived and both the Supreme Court and Congress soon began to
tortify employment discrimination law. The Court’s second significant encounter with Title VII
was in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Although none of the critics of the

46

Id.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note ___, at 254-55 (citing sources); Lemos, supra note ___, at 399 n.155 (stating that
“[f]ans and opponents of Griggs tend to agree that the decision is difficult to square with the available indications of
congressional intent”).
48
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
49
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-82 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 585-87 (2003); see also Eang L. Ngov, When “The
Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection
Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 588 (2011) (concluding that disparate impact’s means of achieving its
goals are not sufficient to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement).
50
For further discussion of employment discrimination law crafted by the Court rather than imported from common
law and tort law, see infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
47
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tortification of employment discrimination law identify the case as a significant step in the
process, it was, and that view of the case will be discussed later.51
The tortification of employment antidiscrimination law can be viewed in two ways. First
and more generally is the changing perception of the laws. Second and more specifically is the
incorporation of specific tort concepts, doctrines, and principles into antidiscrimination law with
no, few, or inadequate modifications.

C. The Changing Perception of the Employment Discrimination Laws
The first statements by justices on the Supreme Court analogizing Title VII to torts and
expressly adopting torts standards are in the various opinions of the Court in 1989 in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.52 Before considering the incorporation of specific tort doctrines into
employment discrimination law, it is instructive to consider changing views of the employment
discrimination laws that have made resort to tort law seem apt and natural. One view of the
statutes is that they are manifestations of public policy regarding civil rights, which attempt to
eradicate and deter the societal wrong of employment discrimination.53 While compensation of
individual victims’ personal injuries is an appropriate goal of public policy/civil rights laws, it is
not the principal objective.54 Another view of the employment discrimination laws is that they
are essentially federal statutory torts, the primary purpose of which is to compensate individuals

51

See infra Part II.B.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
53
See the statement of the Third Circuit in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994),
vacated by 514 U.S. 1034 (1995), supra note ___(2).
54
The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence/eradication of discrimination and compensation in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as
“`achiev[ing] equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.'” Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 429-430 (1972)). The Court then went on to recognize that ‘[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id. at 418. See also
Zemelman, supra note ___, at 191 (“The primary emphasis on deterrence, rather than compensation, is reflected in
the language and judicial interpretation of Title VII’s backpay provision.”).
52
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for the personal injuries they suffer as a result of discrimination.55 In the half century since the
passage of Title VII, the perception of the employment discrimination laws among courts,
commentators, employers and the general public has moved from the first view toward the
second.
A strong critic of the tortification of employment discrimination law, Cheryl Zemelman,
expressed her assessment in 1993 that there had been “a two-decade evolution of Title VII from
a public policy-enforcing statute, designed to promote employer responsibility, to a
compensatory, tort-like statue, aimed at making victims whole . . . . [such that] the privatization
of Title VII has become so complete that once unthinkable characterizations of the statute now
seem commonplace.”56 How did perception of the employment discrimination laws, a group of
public policy and civil rights statutes, so evolve? This Section considers three things that either
indicate a shift in perception or provided impetus for such a shift or both: 1) the enactment of
section 1981a as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; 2) the shift in the predominant type of
claims from those based on refusal to hire to claims based on termination; and 3) the Supreme
Court’s and other courts’ increasing restrictions on use of the class action device in employment
discrimination litigation, which has been somewhat analogous to the restrictions placed on use of
the class action for mass torts.
The enactment of section 1981a57 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 199158 was a good
and needed change in employment discrimination law. Nonetheless, that change probably has
contributed to the view of the employment discrimination laws shifting toward statutory torts.
55

See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 985 (2010) (stating that
“legislatures have the authority to fashion statutory torts--relational wrongs that give rise to private rights of action. .
. . [t]his is what statutes like Title VII are all about”).
56
Zemelman, supra note ___, at 188 & 196.
57
42 U.S.C. §1981a.
58
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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Section 1981a made capped compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials available for
disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
enactment of section 1981a brought more consistency and uniformity to the remedies available
for various types of discrimination, although the caps preserved some of the inequality and
inconsistency. Before the enactment of section 1981a, plaintiffs with race claims had been able
to seek damages and have jury trials under Section 198159 and age discrimination plaintiffs had
been able to have jury trials and recover liquidated damages under the ADEA.60 Outside of race
and age claims, the principal monetary remedy available to other employment discrimination
plaintiffs was backpay. Under Title VII before the 1991 Act, sexual harassment plaintiffs, if they
did not lose their jobs, often would not have recovered money, other than attorney’s fees.61 The
1991 Act changed that with the addition of capped compensatory and punitive damages62 and
thereby partially rectified a disparity among the types of discrimination claims. Thus, there were
very good reasons for Congress to enact section 1981a, adding damages and jury trials for
discrimination claims that previously did not have those features. The addition of the damages
59

See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 553,
602-03, 612 (report of the House Committee on Education and Labor) (stating that in providing for damages the Act
“authorizes damage awards in Title VII cases in the same circumstances as such awards are now permitted under 42
U.S.C. section 1981 for intentional race discrimination”); see also Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for
Caps on Title VII Damage Awards: The Shield of Koldstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U.J.L. PUB.
POL’Y 477, 481-82 (2011) (stating that “Congress acted to at least mitigate the disparity created by this set of legal
developments by enacting a new section, 1981a”); Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 709 (2010) (“42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides a federal
remedy for race discrimination but does not contain the damages caps found in Title VII”).
60

29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 64-69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 553, 602-07;
Harper, supra note __, at 481 (stating that Congress saw a need to provide additional remedies “in light of the
disparity between the legal damages the Court made available for race discrimination in private employment through
its interpretation of section 1981 and the limited equitable relief available for sex and other proscribed forms of
employment discrimination available under section 706(g) of Title VII”).
62
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 2 (1991) (stating the congressional finding
that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination
in the workplace”); Chamallas, Discrimination, supra note ____, at 2142 (noting that “[t]he most important change
came with respect to remedies: for the first time, Title VII plaintiffs were permitted to obtain jury trials and to
recover compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to monetary awards for backpay”).
61
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also strengthened the compensatory objective of the employment discrimination laws and that
change, to some, made them seem more tort-like.63 Indeed, the Supreme Court suggested as
much in a decision regarding the taxability of an award of backpay under Title VII. In United
States v. Burke, the Court stated that “one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the
availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff.”64 The Court responded to
the argument that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the remedial provisions and thus made
Title VII claims “inherently tort-like in nature,” by explaining that although “Congress’ decision
to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages under the amended Act signals a
marked change in tis conception of the injury redressable by Title VII,” that change could not be
attributed to the statute before the amendment.65
Thus, the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s amendment to add damages has been viewed as
bolstering the compensation objective of the employment discrimination laws and making them
more tort-like. Although this view of the change in Title VII (and the ADA) wrought by the
Civil Rights Act is facile,66 it nonetheless seems to have influenced thinking that the employment
discrimination laws became more tort-like with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
A second development that has contributed to the view that the employment
discrimination laws have become more tort-like is the shift over the years in the type of adverse
employment actions challenged in a majority of discrimination claims67 and the interaction of
that change with the predominant employment law principle in the United States--employment at
63

See Zemelman, supra note ___, at 196-97 (positing that “because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 now directly
authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII plaintiffs, numerous lawyers, members of Congress,
and executive officers believe that Title VII has become a tort statute”).
64
504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992) (ruling on taxability superseded by statute).
65
Id. at 241 n.12.
66
It fails to take into account or give proper weight to the following: 1) the dual objectives of the discrimination
statutes; 2) the relationship between the two objectives: the availability of compensation enhances deterrence; and
3) the objective of Congress to address disparities in the remedies among the various types of discrimination.
67
Zemeleman, supra note __, at 194.
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will. In the first years after enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal to hire, but
over the years the majority of claims have become discharge claims.68 That shift should come as
no surprise because over the years employment opportunities became more open to those to
whom they had been denied in the past. However, the shift from claims based on refusal to hire
to claims based on terminations brought the employment discrimination laws increasingly into
tension with employment at will, the basic governing principle for employment termination in 49
of 50 states.69 Employment at will provides that, absent contractual, statutory or other
restrictions, an employer can fire an employee for any reason (often stated as “good reason, bad,
reason, or no reason at all”).70 Employment at will is a longstanding, deeply entrenched, and
fundamental principle of employment law in the United States.71 When employees are
terminated, many believe their termination is wrongful or unjustified, they experience it as a
personal injury, and many want to sue their former employer for “wrongful termination” or
“wrongful discharge.” Yet, in a nation dominated by employment at will, few plaintiffs can
assert viable claims for wrongful discharge. While most states recognize a tort denominated as
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the tort is ill-defined, and it is notoriously hard

68

See, e.g., See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that “hiring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50
percent in 1966, but by 1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1”); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson &
Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post
Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 175, 177-80 (2010).
69
Forty-nine states are characterized as employment-at-will states. The Montana Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act of 1987 removes that state from the list, although weakly. Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-901 to-914
(2002).
70
See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) (“All may dismiss their employe(e)s at will, be
they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong.”), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996) (stating the
“employer's presumptive right to fire employees at will--for good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all”).
71
See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (“To understand the American system, therefore, it is necessary to understand the
doctrine of employment at will, its fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary
to recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.”).
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for plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory.72 However, plaintiffs who can allege terminations
because of race, sex, age, etc. under the employment discrimination laws often have viable
claims. Thus, employers, employees, and courts understand that the most significant source of
legal protection against unjust termination in the United States is the employment discrimination
laws. Thus, increasingly the discrimination laws have come to be perceived as statutory
wrongful discharge torts.73 Moreover, this may have led to a divisive view of the employment
discrimination laws--that the laws bestow job protection on “protected classes.” 74
A third matter regarding the changing perception of the employment discrimination laws
is that the courts increasingly have made the class action device difficult to use in employment
discrimination.75 This change is roughly analogous to the restrictions that the courts have placed
on the class action device for mass torts,76 and evinces the perspective that employment
discrimination is, or has become, just another font of tort law. As Professor Selmi explained in
2003:

72

See, e.g., J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize
Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 392-402 (1995).
73
Cf. Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed Prominence for Contract
Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 193, 208-09 (2010) (stating that Title VIVI
can be used as “a representative wrongful discharge statute” because “it provides the basis for the most commonlylitigated claims related to employment”).
74
See Estlund, supra note __, at 1679 (explaining that “superimposition of the antidiscrimination laws on top of an
at-will background . . . may also contribute to . . . divisive tensions between the members of “protected groups,”
such as women and minorities, and other employees[;] [w]hile the latter normally have no recourse at all against an
unfair employment action, including discharge, the former may have a potential remedy if they plausibly claim
discrimination”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts on the
Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA.. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 81 (1998) (positing that “[i]t may appear to
some white co-workers that minorities are getting something they are not-that the employer, when dealing with
minority employees (and women), is considering and reviewing adverse decisions more carefully, while they
themselves remain subject to the unalloyed and merciless at-will regime”).
75
Zemeleman, supra, note ___, at 194.
76
See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059 (2012) (explaining why the
class action device is disfavored for mass torts); Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil
Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice—Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit
(Part II), NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 330, 339 (2010).
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. . . [T]oday the lawsuits have largely become just another variation of a
tort claim where monetary relief is the principal, and often the only, goal of the
litigation. Along with this shift in emphasis has come a dramatic change in our
perspective on the persistence of discrimination. There is no longer any concerted
effort to eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing
monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular concern for
preventing future discrimination, or even remedying past discrimination, through
injunctive relief. For firms, discrimination, claims are now like accidents--a cost
of doing business, which necessarily implies that a certain level of discrimination
will persist. One reason for the change in the nature of the litigation is that
employment discrimination class actions have evolved into a purely private realm
with little to no government oversight--indeed, . . ., with hardly any oversight at
all.77
The increasing restrictions on use of the class action are a significant limitation in
employment discrimination law. If employment discrimination is not an individual, isolated, and
sporadic phenomenon,78 then we would expect claims and litigation to involve systemic claims;
moreover such approaches would be needed to address effectively the type and scope of
employment discrimination that routinely occurs. Indeed, two theories of discrimination,
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact, address systemic discrimination.79 The
EEOC believes that a focus on systemic claims is worth the agency’s focus and commitment of
resources.80 Systemic claims of discrimination often are pursued using the class action device.

77

Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation
and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251-52 (2003).
78
See, e.g., Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003) (stating that “discrimination today rarely operates in
isolated states of mind; rather, it is often influenced, enabled, and even encouraged by the structures, practices, and
opportunities of the organizations within which groups and individuals work”).
79
Id. at 119-126 (discussing systemic disparate treatment); id. at 136-44 (discussing disparate impact). See
generally Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Class, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 409 (2012) [hereinafter Zimmer, Wal-Mart].
80
The EEOC launched its systemic initiative in 2006. See Leslie E. Silverman et al., Systemic Task Force Report,
EEOC (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm. The EEOC reaffirmed its
commitment to the systemic initiative in its 2012-16 Strategic Plan. See United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012 – 2016, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic_plan_12to16.cfm#_edn23.
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Yet, over the years the Court and courts increasingly have restricted the availability of class
actions in employment discrimination.81
The Supreme Court’s decision in 2011 in Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,82 in which the
Court disallowed certification of a sex discrimination class of perhaps over a million and a half
sales associates, is the latest, and perhaps most significant, manifestation of the limitation of
class actions in employment discrimination law. In Dukes, female sales associates at Wal-Mart
stores throughout the nation sought class certification for their claims that Wal-Mart engaged in
intentional discrimination in denying women promotions and in suppressing pay of women
compared to men. In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court held that a class action could not
be certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The majority gave several
procedural reasons, and one was because class actions are not available under Rule 23(b)(2)
when claims for monetary relief are more than incidental to claims for injunctive or declaratory
relief.83 The dissent actually agreed that certification was not appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2),
but opined that the certification might have been possible under 23(b)(3), if not for the majority’s
finding that the requirements of 23(a) were not satisfied.84
Dukes has both its defenders85 and its detractors.86 However, whether Dukes was a good
or reasonable decision is not the point here. It is the latest evidence of the Court restricting the

81

See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 DENV. U. L. REV.1, 56 (1990)
(stating that “[t]he present Court operates from a highly atomistic, individualistic view of society. Hence, it can
support the claims of a plaintiff such as Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse but is strongly disinclined to permit the
problems of racism and sexism to be addressed systemically by either legislation or lower courts. Discrimination
issues are restricted to one-on-one showdowns, deciding who is right and who is wrong.”).
82
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
83
Id. at 2560.
84
Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
85
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 28 [hereinafter
Sherry, Hogs](“Bringing a class action in order to rewrite the substantive law of employment discrimination to
include implicit bias and structural discrimination was thus overreaching at its worst.”).
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availability of the class action device in employment discrimination cases. How much Dukes
actually restricts the class action remains to be seen.87
The Supreme Court’s limitations on the use of class actions in employment
discrimination are somewhat analogous to some of the restrictions on use of class actions for
mass torts. Some of the concerns regarding use of the class action in the two contexts are the
same.88 Additionally, some judges and commentators are concerned that the employment
discrimination class action has become too much like the tort class action—largely private
litigation with little oversight in which the principal objective is compensation of the plaintiffs
with much less attention to deterrence.89
Thus, over the half century since the enactment of Title VII, several changes have
provoked or accommodated a changing view of the employment discrimination laws—a view
that they have become more tort-like--more about individual personal injury and compensation
than about the public policy of deterring and eradicating discrimination. This shift results in
courts, lawyers, litigants, and perhaps the public viewing the employment discrimination laws as
statutory torts.

D. Importation of Tort Doctrines and Principles
As the general perception of the employment discrimination statutes has shifted toward
torts, the courts have tortified employment discrimination law in another way. Specific tort
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principles and doctrines have been imported into discrimination law with varying degrees of
modification. The most prevalent, overarching, and practically significant incorporation of tort
law into antidiscrimination law is the adoption of tort standards of causation as the means for
understanding, proving and analyzing the statutory prohibitions on discrimination.
The incorporation of tort cause in fact was discussed in the various opinions in the badly
splintered Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.90 The focal point of the
debate was what causation standard was invoked by Title VII’s statutory language “because of . .
. race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”91 The plurality rejected the idea that “because of”
means but for causation.92 The Court borrowed a procedural framework from constitutional law,
requiring the plaintiff to prove as the prima facie case that the relevant protected characteristic
was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, and the burden of persuasion then
shifting to the defendant to prove that it would have taken the same action in the absence of a
discriminatory motive (the same-decision defense).93 The analysis had been developed in Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,94 a case in which a terminated public school teacher asserted a
First Amendment free speech claim.95 The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse selected
“motivating factor” as the standard of causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie case, 96 whereas the
Court in Mt. Healthy expressed the standard as “`substantial factor’ or to put it in other words, . .
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. a `motivating factor.’”97 Justice O’Connor’s influential concurring opinion,98 argued that
“because of” did mean “but for,” and she was not willing to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant employer on the same-decision defense until the plaintiff satisfied a more demanding
standard of causation at the prima facie case stage.99 Thus, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
selected “substantial factor,” treating it as a higher standard and not subscribing to the
interchangeability of “motivating factor” and substantial factor” in Mt. Healthy. Referring to the
“statutory employment `tort’ created by Title VII,”100 Justice O’Connor turned to torts case law
to find a suitable basis for shifting the burden of persuasion and relied on Summers v. Tice,101 in
which the California Supreme Court aided a plaintiff shot by one of two hunters who could not
prove which breach caused the harm by shifting the burden to the defendants to prove they did
not cause the harm.102 She also cited another torts case applying a shifting burden—Kingston v.
Chicago & N.W.R. Co.,103 a case of concurrent sufficient causes, in which one cause of the fire
damage was the railroad company’s negligence and the other was an innocent or unknown
cause.104
The dissent in Price Waterhouse argued that the plurality was incorrect: that “because
of” “by any normal understanding” and as used “in everyday speech” does mean “but for.”105
But for is the minimum standard used in common law approaches, the dissent noted, citing tort
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law.106 The dissent then explained that the plurality actually did, contrary to its protestations,
adopt a but-for causation test in two steps.107
Although the opinions in Price Waterhouse discussed tort causation standards, what the
Court created was a two-part analysis with a shifting burden of persuasion that had no analogue
in tort law. Congress’s subsequent modification of the mixed-motives analysis in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 preserved this employment discrimination analysis that was distinct from tort
causation standards.108 Congress also selected the ostensibly lower standard of causation—
“motivating factor”--rather than “substantial factor” for the plaintiff’s prima facie case that
triggers the shift in the burden of persuasion. Thus, although the mixed-motives analysis
incorporates tort causation standards, the analysis is drawn from other sources of law, and
Congress made adjustments in the statutory version to accommodate the objectives of Title VII.
The adoption of tort standards of cause in fact in Title VII analysis was the most
significant tortification of employment discrimination law because all analyses of intentional
(disparate treatment) discrimination focus on causation. The Price Waterhouse mixed-motives
analysis was developed with the Court disagreeing about the standard of causation to be applied.
Regarding the other principal analysis for individual disparate treatment claims, McDonnell
Douglas/pretext, the Supreme Court has not engaged in a protracted debate or discussion about
what tort cause-in-fact standard it incorporates as it did with mixed-motives. The Court has

106

Id. at 282 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265
(5th ed. 1984)).
107
Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108
See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note __, at ___ (17) (“This two-tiered factual cause standard does not
mimic traditional tort cause standards, especially given that if the employer prevails on the second step, the
employer wins only a partial defense to damages.”).

27

suggested, however, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., that the pretext analysis
incorporates but-for causation.109
The formula developed by the Court for the statutory language “because of” provides that
discriminatory motive must be the cause in fact of the adverse job action. This incorporation of
tort law cause-in-fact standards into the core of intentional discrimination analysis has been
criticized by many scholars. One commentator posits that the formula is not apt because the
analogy to tort causation is flawed. Motives do not cause discriminatory acts; thus, “trying to
interpret human actions as if they were problems in causation is fundamentally flawed.”110
Similarly, other commentators have argued that the causation formula fails to depict how the
phenomenon of discrimination actually occurs, as it often results from unconscious or subtle
bias.111
My critique of the tortification of employment discrimination law does not end, however,
with the propriety of adoption of tort principles. It is one thing to criticize the Court for the
importation of tort cause-in-fact standards into employment discrimination law--the most
important and far-reaching tortification of discrimination law. Nonetheless, the cause-in-fact
standards are well-established, deeply imbedded, and, in fairness, not far removed from the
statutory language. So, I do not expect the Supreme Court to adopt a new approach to
importation of tort law and consequently abandon the cause-in-fact standards. However, another
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facet of tortification is the modification of tort concepts either at the time of adoption or over
time to better achieve the objectives of employment discrimination law. Even if one lauds or
accepts the Court’s adoption of cause-in-fact standards, the Court’s trajectory in developing and
adjusting cause-in-fact law in employment discrimination has been far less impressive.
The most basic tort cause-in-fact standard, and the most onerous for torts plaintiffs to
satisfy, is but-for causation. As discussed, the various Price Waterhouse opinions debated
whether Title VII’s “because of” language requires a but-for causation standard, with the
plurality asserting that it did not. What emerged from Price Waterhouse was a proof framework
that actually did, when one considers the two parts of the mixed-motives analysis, as the dissent
argued, maintain but-for causation. However, the shifting burden of persuasion was an
innovative adjustment, which enabled the plaintiff to move forward and even win the case by
proving a lower standard of causation at the prima facie case stage, subject to rebuttal by the
defendant’s same-decision defense. As Justice O’Connor noted, there were a few types of torts
cases in which such a variation on but-for causation was used. Thus, one could have been
optimistic at the time of Price Waterhouse and Congress’s adjustment of the Price Waterhouse
mixed-motives analysis that the Court and Congress would appreciate the differences between
tort law and employment discrimination law and adjust the tort causation standards appropriately
over time as employment discrimination cases arose that demonstrated the need.
The evolution of tort cause-in-fact standards reached its nadir in 2009. The promise of
Price Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and innovative circuit court opinions, such as
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,112 that Congress and the Courts would adjust tort cause in fact to
accommodate the objectives of employment discrimination law foundered on Gross v. FBL
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Financial Servs., Inc.113 In a surprising opinion, the Court addressed an issue on which it had
not granted certiorari, holding that the mixed-motives analysis, with its shifting burdens, does not
apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The majority opinion in the five-four
decision insists that the statutory language “because of” does mean but-for causation,114 and
expresses distaste for the burden-shifting mixed-motives framework.115 The Gross decision,
thus, retreats from the innovative mixed-motives variation on but-for causation and arguably
entrenches the but-for standard in all employment discrimination statutes that use only the
“because of” language,116 thus all statutes except Title VII, to which the Civil Rights Act of 1991
added “motivating factor.”117
The dissenting opinions in Gross disagreed with the majority’s equation of but for with
“because of” and its departure from both Price Waterhouse and perceived Congressional intent
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.118 One dissenting opinion focused on the differences between
tort law and employment discrimination law that justify application of different principles.
Justice Breyer’s dissent expressed that view as follows:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” causation. In that
context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical
causation make the concept of “but-for” causation comparatively easy to
understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different matter to
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determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.119
Although there were negative reactions from influential people and organizations and
calls for Congressional action120 with proposed legislation to overrule the decision introduced in
Congress (the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act121), Gross remains the law.
In my view of the tortification of employment discrimination law, Gross is perhaps the
most disappointing and alarming decision of the Supreme Court. Having adopted torts cause-infact standards and having shown that it is able to adjust the torts principles to better serve
employment discrimination law, the Court limited the adjustments and innovations and reverted
to the most basic causation standard that also is the most onerous for plaintiffs to satisfy. This is
not a propitious trajectory for the management of transplanted tort doctrine.
Cheryl Zemelman cites the application of the unclean hands doctrine to the after-acquired
evidence principle as an incorporation of tort law into antidiscrimination law.122 The issue posed
by after-acquired evidence is what effect it has on an employment discrimination claim when a
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plaintiff proves a discriminatory motive for an adverse employment action, but the employer
offers evidence that after the discriminatory action was taken it discovered evidence of
wrongdoing by the employee that would have justified the decision even absent the
discriminatory motive. The issue is intertwined with cause in fact because the after-acquired
evidence could not cause the adverse employment action if it was not known at the time of
decision. Zemeleman criticized an approach to after-acquired evidence followed by some courts
whereby a plaintiff’s recovery was barred if an employer could produce after-acquired evidence
and prove that it would have taken the adverse employment action for that reason absent the
discriminatory reason.123 This unclean-hands-infused treatment was ameliorated by the
Supreme Court’s later decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,124 in which the
Court held that after-acquired evidence does not bar recovery, but such evidence may, under
some circumstances, be introduced to cut off the monetary remedies from the date of discovery
of such evidence. Nonetheless, the Court did not go as far as it might have in favor of
employment discrimination law. It could have held that after-acquired evidence was
inadmissible and irrelevant to the plaintiff’s recovery.125
A further incorporation of tort law into employment discrimination law, although less
express, is the Supreme Court’s recognition of hostile environment sexual harassment as a
covered type of employment discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.126 The
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harassment theory, particularly hostile environment,127 is very tortlike,128 focusing on the
dignitary harm that results from the discrimination.129 The Supreme Court, in developing the
employer’s affirmative defense to liability for supervisor sexual harassment in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, invoked the tort doctrine of avoidable consequences.130
The foregoing are some of the most salient examples of tort law being imported into
employment discrimination law. Although there are other examples,131 the Court’s recent
incorporation of proximate cause theory to determine subordinate bias liability is the latest
example, and it ushers into employment discrimination law a tort principle that has been more
troublesome in torts than cause in fact.

II. McDonnell Douglas Framework: A Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur
A few commentators and some courts have remarked that the analysis developed in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green is an incorporation of the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
into antidiscrimination law.132 This Part explores the relationship between the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis and res ipsa. It also contends that the most significant analysis in
employment discrimination law should not have been, and should not be, modeled on a tort
analysis used for unusual cases in which the breach in a negligence claim is a mystery. It begins
by examining the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
127
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A. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Latin for “The Thing Speaks for Itself”
The tort “doctrine”133 of res ipsa loquitur seems to be an exotic mantra imbued with
mystical powers. In fact, it is not so mysterious. It is well explained as a rule regarding the use
of circumstantial evidence in a negligence case.

The Restatement Third of Torts describes res

ipsa in this way: “[R]es ipsa loquitur is circumstantial evidence of a quite distinctive form. The
doctrine implies that the court does not know, and cannot find out, what actually happened in the
individual case. Instead, the finding of likely negligence is derived from knowledge of the
causes of the type or category of accidents involved.”134 Differently stated, res ipsa permits the
fact finder to infer or presume a breach by the defendant(s) when the plaintiff has difficulty
producing evidence of a specific act or acts by the defendant(s) that constitute a breach of the
standard of care.
The incantation and invocation of res ipsa is seductive. From many years of grading the
Torts exams of first-year law students, I know that they are eager to find res ipsa in every exam,
if not every fact pattern on an exam. Perhaps it is the allure of the Latin.135 Plaintiffs also seem
to be eager to include res ipsa in their pleadings and requested jury instructions. For plaintiffs
and their attorneys, however, the attraction to rely on res ipsa is likely more than the Latin. Res
ipsa enables a plaintiff who successfully invokes it to take a case to the fact finder without
proving the precise breach committed by the defendant.136 Rather, the jury is instructed that it
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may find some undefined breach by the defendant based on the circumstantial evidence.
Plaintiffs likely enjoy a second less obvious advantage under res ipsa. The cause in fact inquiry
becomes muddled, and defendants often have no clear target in arguing absence of cause in
fact.137 The but-for causation test inquires whether the damage would have occurred if the
breach had not occurred. If the breach is presumed but not clearly defined, it is more difficult to
answer the counterfactual inquiry posed by cause-in-fact analysis. Thus, if the fact finder is
willing to infer an ill-defined breach, it may be willing to presume cause in fact as well.
For a doctrine shrouded in mystery, there is nothing mysterious about the source that
gave it impetus,138 although that case was not its origin.139 The phrase is traced to the
pronouncement of Chief Baron Jonathan Frederick Pollock in the 1863 British case Byrne v.
Boadle.140 The case involved a barrel falling out of a shop on a London street, hitting a passerby,
and permanently injuring him. The attorney for the business argued that the plaintiff had not
proven a breach by the defendant or its employees. Chief Baron Pollack launched the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur on its dubious career when he responded, “There are certain cases of which it
may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this is one of them.”141 However, the doctrine would be more
fully developed in two subsequent cases.142 The dissent of Chief Justice Erle in Scott v. London
and St. Katherine Docks Co.143 suggested the addition of the predicate facts that the injury-
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causing thing is shown to be under the control of the defendant or its servants and such accidents
ordinarily do not happen if those in control of the thing use proper care.144 Next in Briggs v.
Oliver, the phrase res ipsa loquitur was combined with the predicate facts from Erle’s dissent.145
One commentator’s chronology of the development of the doctrine traces it back to an earlier
principle in English law of presumptive negligence when passengers of common carriers were
injured and suffered from a deficit of evidence to establish a breach by the common carrier.146
The adaptation of this principle of presumptive negligence in the broader range of cases to which
res ipsa was applied was a positive development for plaintiffs, who were aided by the doctrine.147
In American tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts set forth the “principle” of res
ipsa loquitur, stating that negligence may be inferred as the cause of a plaintiff’s damage when
the following predicate facts are established: the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not
happen in the absence of negligence; other causes, such as conduct of the plaintiff and third
parties, is sufficiently eliminated; and the negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s
duty.148 Other courts and authorities have included another element: that evidence of the cause
of the injury is more accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff.149 It has been argued that the
accessibility-to-evidence element is used when courts want to expand res ipsa.150 Although the
Second Restatement’s prerequisites differ from those stated by Chief Justice Erle, the comment
to section 328D recaptured the last element, stating that a plaintiff may eliminate other
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responsible causes by showing that the cause for the event was within the defendant’s
responsibility or that the defendant was responsible for all reasonably probable causes.151
Thus, a central feature of res ipsa law since its inception has been the requirement that a
plaintiff seeking to invoke it must first establish certain prerequisite facts, which justify its
applicability and its bestowing of advantages on the plaintiff. The prerequisite facts provide
some assurance that the defendant most likely did breach the standard of reasonable care in some
undefined or ill-defined way notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inability to prove the particular
breach. The Restatement (Third) explains the reticence about this doctrine: “[R]es ipsa loquitur
does produce an element of discomfort, inasmuch as the defendant can be found negligent
without any evidence as to the nature or circumstances of the defendant's actual conduct. This
discomfort leads to some circumspection in the application of res ipsa loquitur.”152
Notwithstanding the uneasiness with application of res ipsa, the Restatement (Third) pares down
the requirements for application of res ipsa to a more basic requirement: “the accident causing
the plaintiff’s harm is a type of accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a
class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.”153
The role of the prerequisite facts for invoking res ipsa is justification for finding a breach
and perhaps holding a defendant liable despite the plaintiff’s inability to prove a specific breach.
Notwithstanding the vital role of the prerequisites, this is one of the features of res ipsa that has
generated the most disagreement among the courts and authorities. The early English case law
and the Restatement (Second) articulated the requirement of three prerequisites. The
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Restatement (Third) adopted a pared-down test for the applicability of res ipsa154 and rejected
two different versions accepted by some courts. Each of the versions rejected by the latest
Restatement consists of two steps.155 The first applies res ipsa if the accident is of a type that
usually occurs because of negligence and the instrumentality causing the harm was under the
exclusive control of the defendant.156 The other two-step formulation requires that the type of
accident usually happens because of negligence, and such negligence is usually that of the
defendant rather than some other party.157
Thus, one of the most unsettled and vexing features of res ipsa loquitur is the
disagreement and uncertainty regarding the predicate facts which determine whether res ipsa
loquitur applies to a given case. This is no small problem because, as explained, it is the
predicate facts that justify giving a plaintiff the advantages of res ipsa. If there is confusion,
disagreement, or loss of confidence in these foundational facts, then res ipsa is likely to be seen
as creating an unjustified inference or presumption that eases the usual burden and requirements
imposed on plaintiffs in typical litigation. The disagreement and confusion over the prerequisites
or foundational facts and a resulting loss of confidence in the presumption raised by the analysis
are characteristics that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework shares with res ipsa, as will be
developed later.158
Another troublesome feature of res ipsa that also is suffered by McDonnell Douglas is, if
it is applicable to a claim, then what procedural effect does it have. Some jurisdictions interpret
res ipsa as creating a permissible inference of breach, while others have held that it has the more
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significant procedural effect of creating a rebuttable presumption of breach. A majority of
courts have espoused the view that it gives rise to a permissible inference of breach, although
even in those jurisdictions, in an exceptional case the evidence may be such that no reasonable
fact finder could find that the defendant did not breach.159 A minority of jurisdictions, by case
law or statute, accord the greater effect of rebuttable presumption.160 Still other jurisdictions
seem to use “permissible inference” and “rebuttable presumption” interchangeably, not carefully
limning the difference in procedural effect.161 The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged
the tendency of courts to use the terms interchangeably and explained that courts in that state
“have grown more sensitive to the differences between inferences and presumptions, recognizing
that terminology can carry varying procedural implications.”162
A third vexing aspect of res ipsa that it shares with McDonnell Douglas is the uncertainty
regarding the types of cases to which it is applicable. Because res ipsa is considered a rule or
principle regarding circumstantial evidence, which gives the plaintiff a positive procedural effect
after establishing the predicate facts, some authorities and courts reject the applicability of res
ipsa in cases in which direct evidence of breach is presented or available.163 However, this
distinction is based on the much-maligned and ill-defined distinction between circumstantial and
direct evidence.164
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The foregoing three problems, uncertainties, or controversies regarding res ipsa loquitur
lead ineluctably to an overarching characteristic of res ipsa loquitur that it shares with its sibling
McDonnell Douglas: given its nebulous nature, reticence of courts to ease the usual litigation
burdens of plaintiffs without justification, and the skepticism about the inference or presumption
to be drawn based on surrogate questions (substitutes for whether the defendant committed a
breach of the standard of care), the doctrine is more trouble than it is worth. Consequently,
authorities sometimes attempt to limit the applicability and influence of res ipsa, but it has a
dogged tenacity and perseverance, as indicated by its pervasive acceptance and its survival in the
Third Restatement. Its unwillingness to succumb, notwithstanding its many failings, is another
thing it shares with McDonnell Douglas.
A case that demonstrates some of the problems with res ipsa is Linnear v. Centerpoint
Energy Entex/Reliant Energy.165 In several decisions before Linnear, the Louisiana Supreme
Court had defined and refined res ipsa.166 The principles announced in Linnear marked a
significant limitation on use of res ipsa. The plaintiffs, wife and husband, sued for injury of the
wife, who fell on her property and injured her leg. They sued a company that recently had

The problem with the direct-circumstantial distinction is not simply that common beliefs
about the significance of the distinction are false. A more fundamental problem is that the
distinction, while perhaps appealing on the level of intuition, makes no logical sense. There simply
is no category of evidence that brings us into direct contact with crucial facts because no such
contact is possible. All facts are a function of interpretation, and this unavoidability of
interpretation makes all facts a matter of inference and all evidence, whether called “direct” or
“circumstantial,” nothing more or less than a contribution to that inferential process.
Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1804 (2009). See
also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1658
n.220 (2011) (citing 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 24, at 945 n.5 (Peter Tillers
ed., 1983)) [hereinafter, Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading]. Regarding the distinction in the employment discrimination
context, the Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa made the unimportance of distinguishing between direct and
circumstantial evidence a linchpin of its decision. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003).
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replaced a gas line on their property. She sued for negligence in filling the trench and sodding
the area after replacing the gas line. The company produced the testimony of two employees
who worked on the project, who described in detail how the filling and resodding was done. For
their part, the plaintiffs introduced the testimony of the wife regarding the fall and photographs
of the area where the woman fell. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s request for a res ipsa
jury instruction, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the trial court committed reversible error by not giving a res ipsa instruction, and
conducting a de novo review, held that the defendant was negligent. The supreme court
reversed, explaining that it had long held that res ipsa should be applied sparingly167 and
imposing two significant limitations on the applicability of res ipsa. First, the court held that it
“only applies where direct evidence of defendant’s negligence is not available to assist the
plaintiff to present a prima facie case of negligence.”168 The court explained that in the case
before it direct evidence was not only available, but presented and considered.169 Second, the
court stated the three predicate criteria,170 and held that a judge may give a res ipsa instruction
only if the judge concludes that reasonable minds could differ on all three of those facts.171
Considering these two holdings, a commentator concluded that the Louisiana court had narrowed
the applicability of res ipsa.172 Moreover, given that all a plaintiff obtains procedurally from a
res ipsa instruction in Louisiana is a permissible inference of breach, that commentator
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concluded that plaintiffs would be better off without res ipsa, as obvious breaches would speak
for themselves without Latin.173

B. McDonnell Douglas Pretext Analysis: Preventing Discrimination from
Speaking for Itself
The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is a barely modified version of res ipsa loquitur.
The three-stage framework with shifting burdens of production is well-worn and well-known.
The first stage of the framework is for the plaintiff to satisfy the burden of production (produce
sufficient evidence) of four predicate criteria: 1) plaintiff is protected by the applicable
employment discrimination statute; 2) she applied for a job for which she was qualified; 3) she
was not hired; and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
with qualifications like those of plaintiff.174 The Supreme Court also explained in the
McDonnell Douglas opinion itself175 and then later in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.176 that the elements of the prima facie case may vary depending upon the
facts; that qualification will be addressed more fully later.177 If the plaintiff satisfies the burden
of production on the prima facie case, and plaintiffs usually do because so little is required,178 the
plaintiff enjoys a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to
the defendant employer to produce sufficient evidence of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the adverse employment action.179 If the employer satisfies its burden of production
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at stage two, and they almost always do,180 the burden or production shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.181 If the plaintiff proves pretext, then the fact
finder may, but is not required, to find that the employer discriminated.182
Although some have recognized the pretext analysis as a barely modified version of res
ipsa loquitur,183 the Supreme Court has never identified it as such. So let us unveil McDonnell
Douglas a mere pretext for res ipsa. First, both are treatments, rules, or doctrines regarding use
of circumstantial evidence, ascribing procedural consequences to the production of
circumstantial evidence regarding certain issues. As noted above, res ipsa loquitur often has
been called a rule or doctrine regarding circumstantial evidence.184 The Supreme Court made
clear early on that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework was designed to analyze cases
involving circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.185 Second, in order for res ipsa
to apply to a case, certain prerequisites or predicate facts must be established.186 This is true,
too, of the pretext analysis. The Supreme Court explained the reason the predicate facts in the
analysis justify a presumption of discrimination in Furnco v. Constr. Corp. v. Waters:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And
we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that
180

Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas, A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence
in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 665 (1998); see also Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note ___,
at 928 (explaining that “[t]he requirements the defendant must meet are thus minimal: first, the nondiscriminatory
reason must be put into evidence and not just argued and second, the nondiscriminatory reason must not be too
vague, as some courts have rejected nondiscriminatory reasons for vagueness”).
181
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
182
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
183
See sources cited supra note __.
184
See sources cited supra note ___.
185
The Court explained the rationale for according the circumstantial evidence procedural significance in Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). The Court also has expressly stated that the pretext analysis
manipulates circumstantial evidence. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007); St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 536 (1993).
186
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.

43

more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.187

Despite the similarities between res ipsa and the McDonnell Douglas analysis regarding
the predicate facts, there is one respect in which the analyses differ. In the tort doctrine the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing all of the prerequisites for the applicability of res ipsa,
whereas in the pretext analysis, the burden of production shifts between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Thus, unlike in res ipsa, the burden of production on predicates for applicability is
divided in the pretext analysis because it is necessary for the defendant to produce a reason
before the plaintiff can attack that reason as prextextual.
A third similarity between res ipsa and pretext is the variability of the predicates that
must be established for application. The different elements that have been required for res ipsa
are detailed above.188 The Supreme Court explained that the elements of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case vary depending on the facts.189 In most cases, the variation in elements
occurs because the adverse employment action differs from the refusal to rehire at issue in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. As Professor Sullivan has observed, “the famous four
prongs of the prima facie case were tailored to the relatively unusual facts before the Court,
namely an employer's refusal to rehire a qualified black former employee when the job in
question remained vacant.”190 For example, the elements are varied where the complained of
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adverse employment action is a reduction in force.191 Moreover, some courts vary the basic
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case when the claim is one of so-called “reverse
discrimination,” in which the plaintiff is not a member of a historically discriminated against
class, such as a Caucasian or a man.192 Some courts have varied the prima facie case in reverse
discrimination cases, imposing an additional requirement on a plaintiff to produce evidence of
“background circumstances” suggesting that the employer is an unusual employer that would be
likely to discriminate against a member of a class that historically has not suffered substantial
employment discrimination.193
A fourth similarity, and one that is particularly important to this topic, is the procedural
effect accorded the circumstantial evidence under res ipsa and McDonnell Douglas.194 As
discussed above, some jurisdictions at various times have accorded res ipsa the effect of a
rebuttable presumption that a breach occurred, but most give it the effect of a permissible
inference.195 The procedural effect of a plaintiff’s satisfying her burdens of production in the
pretext analysis has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions, culminating with
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Co.196 It is now well established that if a plaintiff satisfies the

191

See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Shifting Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1587-88 (1996).
192
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse
Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2004) [hereinafter, Sullivan, Circling].
193
See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d
1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Sullivan, Circling, supra note ___, at 1065-71; Timothy K. Giordano,
Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the
Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 1001-11 (2000); Donald T.
Kramer, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin Discrimination Violative of Federal
Constitution or Statutes—Private Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1998).
194
See Okediji, supra note ___, at 85 (stating that “[t]he procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur has been as
troublesome in the practice of tort law as the Title VII McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework has been in the
practice of employment discrimination law”).
195
See supra Part II.A.
196
530 U.S. 133 (2000).

45

burdens of production on the prima facie case and pretext, the fact finder may, but is not
required, to infer that the defendant employer illegally discriminated.197
A final similarity between res ipsa and the pretext analysis is the uncertainty regarding
the type of cases to which they apply. For res ipsa, a couple of questions arise: 1) Does it apply
to cases in which a plaintiff attempts to prove a specific breach, and pleads res ipsa and seeks a
res ipsa jury instruction in the alternative?; 2) Does it apply to cases in which direct evidence is
introduced, and if it is not applicable in such cases, does such inapplicability depend on which
party introduced the direct evidence? Of course, a very difficult and pivotal issue imbedded in
those questions is how does a court distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. As
for the pretext analysis, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins198 was the origin of the dividing line that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applied to
cases involving circumstantial evidence, but not to cases involving direct evidence, to which the
mixed-motives analysis, originally developed in Price Waterhouse applied.199 However, after
Congress modified and codified the mixed-motives analysis in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Supreme Court decided in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, based on the language of the statutory
change, that the mixed-motives analysis is not restricted to cases in which direct evidence of
discrimination is produced.200 Now, there is great uncertainty and confusion about the types of
cases to which the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies.201
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In sum, the similarities between res ipsa loquitur and the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis and the problems they share are striking. The most significant difference between the
McDonnell Douglas proof structure and res ipsa is the shifting burdens of production under
McDonnell Douglas, and the fact that the plaintiff does enjoy a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination after establishing a prima facie case. This is an insignificant distinction, however,
because almost every defendant employer rebuts that presumption by producing evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.202 Moreover, the shifting burden is merely a burden of
production, unlike the mixed–motives analysis in which the burden of persuasion shifts.203
Although res ipsa does not impose shifting burdens of production, in reality defendants do
produce evidence to attempt to rebut both the prerequisites for application of res ipsa and the
ultimate issue of a breach by the defendant. Ultimately, then, both res ipsa and McDonnell
Douglas give plaintiffs the advantage of a permissive inference—permitting, but not compelling,
the fact finder to infer breach or employment discrimination, respectively.
Given the foregoing similarities between res ipsa and the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it
is a sound conclusion that the pretext analysis is essentially res ipsa with slight and insignificant
modifications. McDonnell Douglas looks like res ipsa, performs like it, and shares its problems.
One may ask why the Supreme Court did not declare its importation of tort law in its McDonnell
Douglas opinion. As discussed earlier, the Court has baldly declared in several employment
discrimination cases, including Staub most recently, that it was borrowing from tort law. A few

202

See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 254 (1981); Miles v. MNC Corp., 750
F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474
(1992) (“The fact that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas usually is of no
consequence because the plaintiff's burden of making out that case, and the defendant's rebuttal burden of showing a
`legitimate nondiscriminatory’ reason, are so easily satisfied. Almost all individual cases under McDonnell Douglas
come down to a determination whether the plaintiff has proved that the `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’
offered by the defendant is really a pretext for discrimination.”).
203
See supra Part I.D.

47

possible answers occur. First, perhaps the Court did not realize that it was importing res ipsa
into employment discrimination law. Second, maybe the Court realized that it was importing res
ipsa, but it did not think it important to say that it was doing so. Third, McDonnell Douglas was
the third Title VII case decided by the Supreme Court, and the notion that Title VII was merely a
statutory tort or that tort law could be adopted to do the work of a civil rights and public policy
statute might have been surprising or controversial in 1973. Regardless of why the Court did not
identify the pretext analysis as largely unexpurgated tort law, the exposure of it as such prompts
three questions: 1) What other options did the court have?; 2) Was it appropriate to import res
ipsa as the most fundamental analysis in employment discrimination law?; and 3) Regardless of
the propriety at the time of adoption, is it appropriate to retain it today? The questions and
answers are related and are treated together in the next Section.

C. The Appropriateness of Res Ipsa Loquitur for Employment Discrimination
Law
1. In the Beginning
Should the Supreme Court have adopted, and only slightly adapted, res ipsa loquitur as
the basic analysis for the most common type of employment discrimination claim—individual
disparate treatment? The answer depends in part on what alternatives existed. Could the Court,
rather than importing res ipsa, have created new law? Of course it could have. In fact, much of
the McDonnell Douglas opinion is hard to understand if one does not see it as the Court’s effort
to explain why the innovative employment discrimination law theory it approved in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.204--disparate impact--did not apply to the type of claim presented in McDonnell
Douglas. The Court explained that the court of appeals had committed error in rejecting the
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employer’s given reason for not rehiring Green.205 The Court further explained that the lower
court had relied on Griggs for the position that exclusionary employment practices that cannot be
justified by their relation to job performance violate Title VII.206 The Court then declared that
Green appeared “in different clothing,” and the expansive principles embodied in the disparate
impact theory of Griggs did not apply to his claim.207 Instead, if Green could not disprove as
pretextual the employer’s reason for not rehiring him, his engaging in an unlawful stall-in, he
would lose. This approach was necessary, the Court explained, to accommodate the “societal as
well as personal interests on both sides of this equation[:] [t]he broad, overriding interest, shared
by employer, employee, and consumer, i[n] efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.”208
Thus, without invoking the term, the Court adopted a barely modified version of res ipsa
loquitur. The Court later would make the res ipsa roots clear when, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, it explained the justification for the pretext analysis: if the most common reasons for an
adverse employment action are eliminated through the three stages of the pretext analysis, then
discrimination more likely than not is the reason for the action.209
So, the Court adopted res ipsa in McDonnell Douglas rather than creating new law as it
had in Griggs. According to the Court’s rationale in McDonnell Douglas, this res ipsa analysis
accommodated the competing interests and the shared interest of employers, employees, and
consumers. Furthermore, as the Court explained more fully in Furnco, the rationale supporting
res ipsa in tort law also fit the context of intentional discrimination analysis: if certain predicate
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facts could be established, then discrimination was a more-probable-than-not explanation of the
adverse employment action at issue, just as breach is a likely cause of the damages in a
negligence case if the res ipsa foundational facts can be established. Moreover, as Justice
O’Connor would explain in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse seventeen years after
the McDonnell Douglas framework was unveiled: “[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is hard to come by.”210 Thus, as with res ipsa, the pretext framework was a tool
bestowed on plaintiffs to help them marshal circumstantial evidence to present a case of
intentional discrimination. In sum, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is essentially res ipsa, with
the formal addition of shifting burdens of production, and the rationale for and purpose of res
ipsa match the rationale for and purpose of the pretext framework.
Should the Court in McDonnell Douglas have adopted res ipsa as the analysis for
individual disparate treatment claims? It is difficult to determine now whether the Court in 1973
made a good decision, but the balancing of interests and rejection of Griggs articulated in
McDonnell Douglas and the post-hoc explanation of the analysis under the res ipsa rationale by
the Court in Furnco and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse are well
reasoned and persuasive. If the Court believed that employment discrimination was common
enough that judges were willing to infer discrimination from a flimsy prima facie case and a
showing of pretext, then res ipsa seemed to function well enough in helping plaintiffs present
cases based on circumstantial evidence. However, over time the shortcomings of res ipsa to
serve as the basic analysis increasingly began to show, and the utter failure now should be
apparent.
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2. Forty Years of Res Ipsa/Pretext
Even if one concludes that the Court’s 1973 adoption of res ipsa in employment
discrimination law was a good, or at least reasonable, decision, the experience with it over forty
years yields a dramatically different assessment of the decision to cling to it now. The chinks in
the armor have been many, and cumulatively they render indefensible the maintenance of res
ipsa in employment discrimination law. This Section addresses two specific developments and
one overarching theme that render maintenance of the McDonnell Douglas/res ipsa regime
untenable now.
a. Two Specific Developments
i. Enervation of the Prima Facie Case and Pretext
First, the Supreme Court in numerous decisions from 1973 to 2003 worked with the
McDonnell Douglas framework, trying to explain its substantive and procedural meaning,
striving to bolster its weak prima facie case, and attempting to retain sufficient flexibility in both
the first (prima facie case) and third (pretext) stages to make the analysis workable across
various types of factual scenarios. The lower courts in turn have worked with what the Supreme
Court has given them, and the result has been confusing, and but for a high tolerance of the
courts to work through uncertainties and vagaries,211 could be close to chaotic.212 The Court
began early on working with the analysis, explaining that variations in the prima facie case
would be necessary and explaining the substantive meaning and procedural effects of the second
and third stages of the analysis. The fact that the Supreme Court and the lower courts have spent
211

Regarding vagaries, consider, for example, two somewhat surprising decisions of the Court: Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that direct evidence is not required to invoke the “motivating factor” statutory
standard inserted in Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991); and Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167
(2009) (holding that the mixed-motives analysis does not apply to age discrimination claims under the ADEA and
the “because of . . .” statutory language in the ADEA means but-for causation).
212
In its decision in Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit used the terms “a quagmire,” a “morass,” and “chaos” to
describe the state of the law on disparate treatment proof structures. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 85153 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). The Ninth Circuit’s assessment predated the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Desert Palace and Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. See infra note ___ (next footnote).

51

so much time tinkering with the proof structure rather than addressing questions about
discrimination, which are sufficiently numerous, complex, and important in their own right, is
indicative of the failure of this res ipsa analysis.213 Ultimately neither the efforts to adjust and
fortify the prima face case nor the explication of the pretext stage have proven efficacious in
maintaining a generally applicable, useful, comprehensible, palatable, and flexible analysis.
The second development that has undermined McDonnell Douglas is the Court’s
recognition that the pretext/res ipsa analysis would not be adequate to evaluate all types of
individual disparate treatment claims and its consequent creation of the alternative mixedmotives analysis, which was (when created by the Court) and is now (as codified) much bettersuited than pretext/res ipsa to evaluating intentional discrimination. Soon after the Court created
the mixed–motives analysis, Congress would codify a modified version of it. The creation of the
second framework and the Supreme Court’s later eradication of the dividing line between the
types of cases governed by each would lead to virtual chaos.
Regarding the variability of the prima facie case, the Court in McDonnell Douglas itself
reserved the possibility that the elements might change depending on the factual situation.214
The Court reiterated that the elements of the pima facie case need to be varied depending upon
the facts in the course of holding that the framework applied to a reverse discrimination case in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.215 As courts applied the analysis to reverse
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discrimination cases in the future, the ill fit between res ipsa analysis and reverse discrimination
cases would become obvious.216
The Court was confronted with the issue of the ease with which virtually any minimally
qualified plaintiff could satisfy the prima facie case and thus achieve a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine.217 The Court responded by
“slipping in” an additional statement about the prima facie case, which Professor Malamud
labeled a “stealth requirement.”218 After the justices exchanged drafts and memoranda about
how light a burden plaintiffs bore under the prima facie case,219 the Court’s final opinion
included the following statement of the prima facie case: “The burden of establishing a prima
facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was
rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”220
Although the stealth requirement has not often been repeated or seemed to make a difference in
many cases since Burdine, it demonstrates that the Court recognized the weakness of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case fewer than ten years after it announced the proof structure,
and it already had wavered from the res ipsa-based rationale it articulated in Furnco. However,
as discussed above, the McDonnell Douglas framework shares this feature--an uncertain and
changing prima facie case--with res ipsa.221
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue again since its 1976 decision in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the inadequacy of the prima facie case has been
216
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particularly evident and vexatious in reverse discrimination cases in the lower courts. The
McDonnell Douglas analysis does not function reasonably in such cases without an adjustment,
and that adjustment is one which flouts the equal treatment foundation of employment
discrimination law. The res ipsa rationale, articulated by the Court in Furnco, for the permissive
inference arising from a plaintiff’s successful navigation of McDonnell Douglas is that
employment discrimination occurs commonly enough that if the two most common reasons for
adverse employment actions are eliminated by the prima facie case and the adverse action
remains unexplained by the employer (because the plaintiff has proven the employer’s proffered
reason to be pretextual), then discrimination is more likely than not the explanation. In reverse
discrimination cases, the foregoing formulation does not work because, by definition, reverse
discrimination has not been historically commonly practiced.222 Accordingly, some courts have
required that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case prove something additional to establish a
prima facie case—background circumstances showing that the employer at issue is one which
would be likely to engage in this historically uncommon type of discrimination.223 However,
other courts object to imposing the additional requirement in the prima facie case,224 some
reasoning that to do so would violate an important theoretical foundation of employment
discrimination law—equal treatment of similarly situated persons.225
Thus, the prima facie case stage of McDonnell Douglas has been revealed as too weak of
a basis to support a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and as inadequately flexible to
address various types of cases.
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In addition to the facts constituting the prima facie case, the other predicate fact upon
which Furnco based the inference of discrimination was the plaintiff’s production of sufficient
evidence that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.
Over the years, the Court has wavered in its conviction about the inference to be drawn from that
predicate fact, as the debate spanned decades and two Supreme Court decisions. In this instance
again, the Supreme Court has spent its resources, as well as those of the lower courts and
litigants, interpreting the meaning of the framework rather than addressing questions about the
ultimate issue of employment discrimination.226 Termed pretext-plus versus pretext-only,227 the
issue was what procedural effect does it have when a plaintiff, at stage three, introduces
sufficient evidence of pretext. The Court addressed the effect of proving pretext vis-à-vis two
burdens that the plaintiff bears: production and persuasion. First, the Court addressed the effect
of proving pretext on the burden of persuasion in 1993 in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
wherein the Court held that proving pretext permits, but does not require, the fact finder to infer
discrimination (permissive inference).228

Although many civil rights advocates and

commentators were chagrined by the holding in St. Mary’s Honor Center,229 it was a result
consistent with the procedural effect generally accorded to res ipsa in tort law, although some
courts and jurisdictions accord res ipsa a stronger effect.230 Realistically, not much more could
be expected from an analysis in which the Court already had shown a significant lack of
confidence.
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The Court considered the procedural effect of pretext in the context of the burden of
production in 2000 in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.231 Considering whether
sufficient evidence of pretext would enable a plaintiff to survive a challenge to sufficiency of the
evidence (summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law), the Court stated as follows: “[A]
plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's
asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated. This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability.”232 So, once again, the answer was that a
plaintiff’s successful navigation of the pretext analysis yields a permissive inference of
discrimination at yet another procedural juncture, although the Court in Reeves suggested that the
permissive inference is stronger at summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law than it is
in St. Mary’s Honor Center at verdict/judgment. Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in
Reeves, found this suggestion somewhat unsatisfactory: “I write separately to note that it may be
incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in
which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to
survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that such circumstances will be
uncommon.”233
Thus, the Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled with the procedural effect and
substantive meaning of two stages of the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis. As discussed
above, these struggles are analogous to the uncertainties and discomforts courts have

231

530 U.S. 133 (2000).
Id. at 148.
233
Id. at 155 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
232

56

experienced with the prerequisite or predicate facts in res ipsa.234 Ultimately what these
struggles have demonstrated is that res ipsa was ill-suited to employment discrimination law, and
the fit has become progressively worse since 1973. The Court and courts have spent substantial
time and resources attempting to mitigate the problems with the framework, but they have failed.
ii. Creation of an Alternative Framework
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins the Court acknowledged that res ipsa/McDonnell
Douglas was inadequate to address all types of individual disparate treatment cases.235 In that
case the Court created what has come to be known as the mixed-motives analysis236 to analyze
cases in which more than one motive causes the employer to take an adverse employment action.
Congress would later modify and codify the mixed-motives analysis in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, thus embedding the “motivating factor”237 and same-decision defense238 stages of the
analysis in Title VII. Faced with the question of which analysis to apply in any given case, the
lower courts crafted a dividing line based on Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence
whereby McDonnell Douglas applied to claims proven by circumstantial evidence and mixed
motives applied to claims supported by direct evidence.239
In 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme Court, saying it was interpreting
the mixed-motives language in Title VII added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, held that direct
evidence is not necessary to obtain a statutory “motivating factor” jury instruction, and thus
erased the line of demarcation between cases analyzed under McDonnell Douglas and those
analyzed under the statutory mixed-motives framework. Since the decision in Desert Palace,
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lower courts have had no guidance on how to decide which of the two analyses applies to any
given case. As mentioned above, this debate is akin to the issue in tort law of whether res ipsa
may be applied in cases in which direct evidence of breach/nonbreach is available.240
b. The Overarching Theme: A Tool for Plaintiffs Becomes a Straightjacket
for Litigants and a Distraction from Consideration of Substantive
Discrimination Issues
As the Supreme Court and lower courts have tinkered with the res ipsa analysis of
employment discrimination law and created an alternative analysis to evaluate some undefined
subset of individual disparate treatment claims, it has become increasingly clear that the
McDonnell Douglas analysis has lost the positive aspects of res ipsa loquitur, while the negative
characteristics of res ipsa have been replicated and exacerbated. The three-stage structure has
become a shibboleth that courts dare not fail to recite, but all the while, they have little to no
faith that if a plaintiff satisfies the prima facie case and pretext, then employment discrimination
is a likely explanation for the adverse employment action.
The elements of the prima facie case and pretext, the stages of the pretext analysis on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of production, are the analogues of the predicate facts for
application of res ipsa. The issues addressed by plaintiffs at these two stages of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis are not about whether discrimination occurred, but issues which may lead to an
inference of discrimination.241 The prima facie case, with its varying elements, is particularly
weak, and courts progressively have come to suspect that it indicates little about the ultimate
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issue of discrimination.242 Thus over its forty years, the res ipsa loquitur of employment
discrimination law has become an exemplar of a phenomenon described by Professor Suzanna
Sherry in which old and established legal doctrines seemingly change abruptly (analogized to
earthquakes) when in reality what has occurred is that the foundational facts embedded within
them and on which the doctrines are based have changed over time (movement of the tectonic
plates).243 Sherry points to St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks244 as an apparent earthquake which
is evidence that the Supreme Court had changed its belief about the foundational facts of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis.245 She posits that the Court might reasonably believe that with the
passage of time since the enactment of the discrimination laws, it has become less likely that
employers intentionally discriminate on prohibited bases.246
If the courts have little confidence that the predicate facts give rise to an inference of
discrimination, then the res ipsa of employment discrimination law is no longer performing its
function, and we would be better off simply addressing the issue of discrimination.247 Still, one
could argue that the framework may serve a useful purpose because some courts will continue to
believe the inference reasonable in some cases; that is, McDonnell Douglas will continue to
serve as a useful tool for some plaintiffs to marshal their circumstantial evidence. However, the
framework presents at least two other problems. First, it suffers not just from reduced usefulness
as a tool, but it has become a hindrance, as courts recite it and require plaintiffs (and defendants)
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to try to fit their evidence into it no matter how their evidence may differ from the framework’s
prescribed elements. Thus, what the Supreme Court designed as a tool to help plaintiffs with
circumstantial evidence has become a straightjacket into which they must force their cases.248
Second, as often mentioned in this article, the courts (as well as commentators, litigants,
employers, and others) view the proof structures as the thing itself, rather than the shadow on the
wall of the cave, and an inordinate number of decisions and other resources are devoted to
explicating, developing, and unraveling the proof structures. Viewing employment
discrimination law in such a distorted way inevitably stunts productive and innovative
development of the law.249
Among the many problems already noted about the McDonnell Douglas framework, it
does not work well for discrimination cases that deviate substantially from the most common
factual scenarios of discrimination.250 Reverse discrimination cases, as discussed above, do not
fit well within McDonnell Douglas/re ipsa because they do not involve historically common
types of discrimination.251 Consider for example, Burlington v. News Corp., a case in which a
Caucasian news anchor was fired after his use of the word “nigger” in a meeting discussing
whether the word should be uttered in a news report caused substantial racial unrest in the
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workplace.252 The Caucasian plaintiff contended that he was disciplined for a nonderogatory
use of the word, while many black employees who also used the word were not disciplined. The
court recognized the threshold question of which analysis it should apply--the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis or mixed-motives. The court said it was using both analyses, but it
posed the key question ostensibly under the pretext stage: “[C]an an employer be held liable
under Title VII for enforcing or condoning the social norm that it is acceptable for African
Americans to say ‘nigger’ but not whites?”253 Thus, the court identified the core discrimination
issue in the case and one that merited careful consideration, but an issue that actually had little to
do with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, although the court dutifully crammed it into the pretext
stage. Examining that issue, the court concluded that African Americans indeed might tolerate
use of the word by other African Americans and be insulted when the word is used by white
people.254 Nevertheless, the court found that even if such a social norm exists, it is the type of
discriminatory social norm that Title VII was enacted to counter.255
In another recent reverse discrimination case, Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., the
ultimate issue focused on comparative treatment of African American and white employees.256
White employees, who were involved in transmission of an email message containing a racially
offensive joke, were fired, while black employees who engaged in arguably similar conduct were
not fired. The court forced the evidence into the McDonnell Douglas analysis, but twice
expressly disclaimed any real operative importance of the analysis:
[E]stablishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and
never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary
252
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judgment motion in an employment discrimination case. Accordingly, the
plaintiff's failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff's
case.257
[A] court merely uses the pretext inquiry to guide its determination of the ultimate
issue at summary judgment—i.e., whether the evidence yields a reasonable
inference of the employer’s discrimination.258
The Eleventh Circuit in Smith went on to find that the plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial
evidence of racial discrimination to avoid summary judgment.259 However, the court’s
blasphemous declarations regarding McDonnell Douglas would cause another court to reassert
fealty to the res ipsa analysis. A federal district court, faced with citation of the Smith apostasy,
declared as follows: “To the extent that Smith suggests the burden-shifting paradigm of
McDonnell Douglas can be ignored in a case based on circumstantial evidence, freeing the
plaintiff from any obligation to establish a prima facie case, it is in tension with a long line of
Eleventh Circuit precedent.”260 Although some courts diverge from the McDonnell Douglas
straightjacket, most do not, and even among those that do, almost all feel constrained to at least
pay lip service to it.
The restrictive effect on the litigation, shoving all evidence into the three stages of the
pretext analysis, and the focus of courts on the framework rather than the real issues of
discrimination thus are intertwined. When courts liberate themselves somewhat from the
McDonnell Douglas vice grip, as in Burlington and Smith, they are able to say, “the real issue in
this case is this,” and then grapple with the actual issues of employment discrimination.
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3. The Tenacity of Res Ipsa/McDonnell Douglas
In light of the weaknesses of the framework and forty years of tinkering with it, one
would think that the Supreme Court long go would have expelled res ipsa from employment
discrimination law. Congress presented a golden opportunity when, in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, it codified a version of the mixed-motives analysis. Indeed, the Court in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa could have sent res ipsa back to tort law rather than leaving lower courts with the
conundrum of which framework applies in a given case, but it did not. Notwithstanding an
outpouring of scholarship arguing that Desert Palace should have signaled the end of McDonnell
Douglas,261 it flourishes. When the Fifth Circuit took on the task of addressing the question left
by Desert Palace in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., it merged the pretext and mixed-motives
analyses into what it termed the “modified McDonnell Douglas analysis,” which retained the
three stages of the pretext analysis,262 although they seemed perfunctory when the court grafted
the “motivating factor” standard of mixed motives onto the third stage as an alternative to
pretext. When bills (the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act) were introduced
in Congress to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Servs, Inc., the
bills expressly stated that the McDonnell Douglas analysis was to be preserved as a way to prove
discrimination under all the employment discrimination laws.263 Thus, notwithstanding its
monumental shortcomings, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure maintains a tenacious and
powerful grip on employment discrimination law—almost like the siren call of res ipsa loquitur
beckoning first-year law students to the perilous shoals of peripheral issues and irrelevant
discussion.
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III. Throwing Res Ipsa Out of the Employment Discrimination
Warehouse
What lessons can be learned from a consideration of McDonnell Douglas as imported tort
law? First, seeing the proof structure as res ipsa helps explain why it increasingly has served
employment discrimination law poorly. Perhaps this view of the hoary pretext analysis will
provide some added impetus for finally dispatching with it and moving to a more appropriate and
more flexible standard. Second and more generally, perhaps this perspective will encourage
Congress and the courts to develop a more deliberative and discriminating approach for
incorporating tort law into employment discrimination law. Adopting such a new approach is
important because tort law still has much to offer the younger and relatively underdeveloped
body of employment discrimination law.
Like the infamous barrel that fell from the warehouse and spawned res ipsa loquitur,
McDonnell Douglas needs to be cast out of employment discrimination law. Regarding the need
to jettison the res ipsa of employment discrimination law, there have been many calls to expel
the McDonnell Douglas analysis,264 but few of them have invoked its ill-matched tort
underpinnings as a reason. Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit, in a recent concurring opinion
called for the abrogation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because, although it was designed
to clarify and simplify a plaintiff’s presentation of her case, “both of those goals have gone by
the wayside.”265 Judge Wood then declared that “[c]ourts manage tort litigation every day
without the ins and outs of these methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment
discrimination litigation . . . could not be handled in the same straightforward way.”266
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Ironically, many employment discrimination law principles, including the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, have been borrowed from tort law.
The McDonnell Douglas proof structure’s declining performance over four decades
already has been chronicled. If the Supreme Court had expressly recognized the analysis as at
least a derivative of res ipsa when it adopted it in 1973, there were reasons based on res ipsa’s
use and track record in tort law to question whether it was appropriate for employment
discrimination law. For one, although res ipsa was a doctrine to be used by plaintiffs to assist
them in presenting circumstantial evidence of a breach, it was a tool of last resort for plaintiffs
who could not otherwise prove a breach. The Court in McDonnell Douglas seemed to
understand that it was establishing the fundamental analytical tool for individual disparate
treatment claims--the most common employment discrimination claims. The pretext analysis
would not be a backup tool like res ipsa was.
Two other distinctions between the use of res ipsa in tort law and the pretext analysis in
employment discrimination also should have raised concerns. First, the Court was adopting,
without significant modification, an analysis for intentional discrimination cases used in torts for
negligence cases. A number of torts doctrines distinguish between negligence and intentional
torts and impose greater burdens on alleged intentional tortfeasors than negligent tortfeasors.267
Perhaps the Court considered that the three stages and shifting burdens of production of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis were an adequate modification of res ipsa. However, considering
the distinction between negligence and intent, the Court might have shifted not just the burden of
production, but also the burden of persuasion. Or the Court might have resolved the pretext plus
267
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vs. pretext only debate in ways more favorable to plaintiffs than it did in St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.268 Second, whereas res ipsa
usually addresses physical acts and physical injuries, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is used to
evaluate a mental state.
Beyond the distinctions between torts and employment discrimination, as discussed
above, res ipsa did not have a sterling record of performance in torts. There were a number of
problems and uncertainties with res ipsa in tort law,269 and those difficulties merited
consideration before it was adopted as the basic analysis for a landmark civil rights and public
policy statute.
Regardless of whether the Court should have adopted res ipsa for employment
discrimination law and whether it could have been modified adequately to accommodate
employment discrimination law, the time has come to push the McDonnell Douglas barrel out of
the warehouse. A superior alternative is readily available. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress codified a version of the mixed-motives analysis in Title VII. The plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case by demonstrating that discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision.270 At that point the employer is liable, but if the employer can demonstrate
(satisfy the burden of persuasion) that it would have made the same decision for
nondiscriminatory reasons, the defendant employer can limit remedies.271 Commentators have
advocated the replacement of the McDonnell Douglas analysis with some version of the mixed-
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motives analysis, at least similar to the one added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.272
That framework resolves or ameliorates many of the problems raised by the pretext analysis.
First, the motivating factor standard does not artificially cabin the types of evidence that must be
presented by the parties. Second, it does not base an inference or presumption of discrimination
on presentation of evidence to satisfy predicate issues that are surrogates for the real issue of
discrimination. Third, the motivating factor standard does not establish an inference or
presumption based on historical patterns of discrimination that may have changed, or that courts
and jurors may think have changed, over time. In the foregoing ways and others, the mixedmotives analysis is less rigid and more generally appropriate than the pretext analysis. Another
reason to adopt it as the replacement is that Congress approved it by making it statutory for Title
VII.
Even if McDonnell Douglas were rejected, another step would be necessary to make the
statutory mixed-motives analysis applicable to individual disparate treatment claims under all the
employment discrimination laws. The Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services
defined the statutory language “because of” as meaning but for causation and rejected the mixedmotives analysis for age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.273 Because of Gross, to effectuate unification of all disparate treatment law under mixed
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motives, either the Court would need to overrule the case, or Congress would have to make the
mixed-motives analysis available under all the employment discrimination statutes.274
Another issue that Congress should consider if the statutory mixed-motives analysis were
to become the sole individual disparate treatment analysis is the effect of the same-decision
defense.275 Under the current Title VII defense, if a defendant satisfies the burden of persuasion
on same decision, it will limit remedies, eliminating all monetary remedies that would go to the
plaintiff. Before recommending that Congress simply amend the statutes to say that the current
statutory mixed-motives analysis applies to all intentional discrimination cases, it is worth asking
whether changes should be made in light of the fact that the pretext proof structure will be gone.
In the 1991 Act, Congress clearly indicated the way in which it wished to modify the Price
Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis. However, if Congress also had thought it were abolishing
the pretext analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis, it might have done things differently,
such as giving a different effect to the same-decision defense. Thus, Congress should consider
modifications to the current statutory mixed-motives proof structure.
Congress is the better body to abrogate McDonnell Douglas than the Supreme Court.276
Although the Court should have dispensed with the pretext analysis in Desert Palace or
thereafter, when it eradicated the line of demarcation between cases to be analyzed under pretext
and mixed motives, the Court did not do so, and nine years after Desert Palace, it still has not
done so. Rather than removing ill-fitting tort principles from employment discrimination law,
Staub demonstrates that the Court is inclined to forge ahead with importation of tort law.
274
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Generally, the Court simply has not expressly overruled employment discrimination
precedents.277 Furthermore, as discussed, if the pretext analysis were thrown out of the
warehouse, there are issues that Congress needs to consider in refining the replacement mixedmotives framework.
Getting rid of the McDonnell Douglas analysis should improve substantially employment
discrimination law. That important step also might prompt consideration of the general issue of
tortification of employment discrimination law. But that is an issue for another day.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s latest foray into tortification of employment discrimination law in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital is alarming. However, one can only guess how the concept of proximate cause will
develop in discrimination law. The McDonnell Douglas/pretext framework, which is a thinly veiled
version of res ipsa loquitur, has a forty-year track record. Whether res ipsa should have been imported
with only minor modifications in 1973 is debatable. Regardless, during its tenure, it has suffered from
declining performance, mangling cases and impeding the innovative development of employment
discrimination law. The time has come to reject this pretext for res ipsa loquitur and let employment
discrimination speak for itself.
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See, e.g., Lemos, supra note __, at 427 (observing that “[i]f judged by the rate of outright reversals, the Court's
decisions in the Title VII arena have been exceptionally stable: not once in the history of Title VII has the Court
overruled a prior opinion”).
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